Statute of Frauds Real Estate Lawyer Houston

15817 Hwy. 6, Santa Fe, Tx. The property description is as follows:

ABST 613 PAGE 6 LOTS 5 thru 7 HIGHWAY 6

UNRECORDED SUB

SANTA FE, TEXAS 0.384 ACRES

a contract for deed need only have the “means or data by which the land to be conveyed may be identified with reasonable certainty.” See Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538 539 (Tex.1972). The law does not require a metes and bounds description or a plat in a recorded subdivision in order for land to be conveyed by a contract for deed. See Keller, 928 S.W.2d at 481.

Thanks to Associate Attorney Sergio Perez for these cases: Courts have held that a description in a writing which states “my property,” “my land,” or “owned by me” is a sufficient description when it is shown by extrinsic evidence that the party to be charged owns a tract and only one tract of land which satisfies the description. Kmiec v. Reagan, 556 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1977); Pick v. Bartel, 659 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex. 1983).

The certainty of the contract may be aided by parol only with certain limitations. The essential
elements may never be supplied by parol. The details which merely explain or clarify the essential
terms appearing in the instrument may ordinarily be shown by parol. But the parol must not
constitute the framework or skeleton of the agreement. That must be contained in the writing.
Thus, resort to extrinsic evidence, where proper at all, is not for the purpose of supplying the
location or description of the land, but only for the purpose of identifying it with reasonable
certainty from the data in the memorandum. O’Herin [**4] v. Neal , Tex. Civ. App., 56 S.W.2d
1105, writ refused.

Pick v. Bartel, 659 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex. 1983)

This Court has held that a description in a writing which states “my property,” “my land,” or
“owned by me” is a sufficient description when it is shown by extrinsic evidence that the
party to be charged owns a tract and only one tract of land which satisfies the description. In
Kmiec v. Reagan, 556 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1977), we held that when the grantor is stated to be the
owner of the property to be conveyed and it is proved that the grantor [**5] owns only a single tract
answering the description, the land is identified with reasonable certainty. When the description of
property in a deed is uncertain, allegations of ownership are an important consideration.

Pick v. Bartel, 659 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex. 1983)

Where the identity of the property is doubtful, ownership becomes an important element. No
relief in this respect is afforded by respondent’s signature to the instruments. It is not a
necessary inference that Mrs. Fisher owned the property simply because she contracted to
sell it. [*638] Starkey v. Texas Farm Mortgage Co., Tex. Civ. App., 45 S.W.2d 999, writ refused.
The description of the property is otherwise wholly deficient. No city, county or state is
mentioned in connection with its location.

Pick v. Bartel, 659 S.W.2d 636, 637-38 (Tex. 1983)

The quoted description of Second Tract does not refer to any other existing writing. Our problem,
then, is to analyze the description to see if it furnishes, within itself, the means or data by which the
tract may be identified with reasonable certainty.

Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. 1972)

The record leaves little doubt that the parties knew and understood what property was intended to
be conveyed as Second Tract. Moreover, a surveyor, by a search of abstract records and on
directions given by an attorney, located the property on the ground and made a plat which was
introduced in evidence and shows its location and boundaries. However, the knowledge and intent
of the parties will not give validity to the contract, Rowson v. Rowson, 154 Tex. 216, 275 S.W.2d
468, 470 (1955); and neither will a plat made from extrinsic evidence. Matney v. Odom, 147 Tex.
26, 210 S.W.2d 980, 984 (1948). The correct rule relating to [*541] admissibility of parol evidence to
aid descriptions [**7] in contracts for the conveyance of land is thus stated in Wilson v. Fisher, 144
Tex. 53, 188 S.W.2d 150, 152 (1945):

Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 540-41 (Tex. 1972)

There is in the record strong evidence that the parties intended to describe a particular and
identified tract of 12.375 acres in their contract, and that they were mutually mistaken in the
belief that the description used was legally sufficient for that purpose. If that be a fact,
Morrow would have been entitled to reformation of the contract had he sought it. Miles v.
Martin, 159 Tex. 336, 321 S.W.2d 62 (1959); Kelley v. Ward, 94 Tex. 289, 60 S.W. 311 (1901);
Gilbert v. Smith, 49 S.W.2d 702, 86 A.L.R. 445 (Tex.Com.App. 1932). It thus appears that
Morrow may have tried his case on a wrong theory.

Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Tex. 1972)

Defendant’s first two points of error contest the legal sufficiency of the description “415 Holley,
Sherman, Texas.” In Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 188 S.W.2d 150 (1945) the court stated that a
property description must furnish the means or data by which the land in question can be identified
with “reasonable certainty” in order to satisfy the statute of frauds. Id. at 56-57, 188 S.W.2d at 152.
[**3] The purpose of a description is to “afford a means of identification,” not necessarily to identify.
Krueger v. W. K. Ewing Co., 139 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Tex. Civ. App. — El Paso 1940, no writ). Thus, a
street address or a commonly-known name for property may be sufficient if there is no
confusion. See A.A.A. Realty Co. v. Neece, 292 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Tex. Civ. App. — Fort Worth
1956) (“Catalina Motel, 1409 East Scott Street, Wichita Falls, Texas,” sufficient when vendor
owned only one Catalina Motel in Wichita Falls), aff’d, 156 Tex. 614, 299 S.W.2d 270 (1957);
Krueger v. W. K. Ewing Co., 139 S.W.2d at 839 (“San Gabriel Apartments” sufficient when
building so known for twelve years and date line of offer to purchase listed San Antonio,
Texas); Sorsby v. Thom, 122 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex. Civ. App. — Galveston 1938, writ dism’d) (“Rock
Island Plantation” sufficient when property so known for twenty-five years and all
transactions occurred in Hempstead, Texas). Each of the descriptions set out above furnished
sufficient means of identifying the property, when considered with the aid of tendered extrinsic proof.
In Pickett v. Bishop, 148 Tex. 207, 223 S.W.2d [**4] 222 (1949) the supreme court stated that even a
description using the words “my land,” “my property,” or “owned by me” to indicate a particular tract
within a more general area is sufficient if supported by extrinsic evidence that that party owned only
one tract fitting the description in the contract. Id. at 210, 223 S.W.2d at 223.

Butler v. Benefield, 589 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.)

However, be mindful that the doctrine of part performance acts as an exception to the statute of frauds, and that a claimant to a property may prevail with no writing at all.

Generally, a contract for the sale of real estate is unenforceable unless it is in writing and signed by the person charged with the promise. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 26.01. Partial performance, however, will operate to exempt an oral contract for the sale or transfer of real property from the statute of frauds. Boyert v. Tauber, 834 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tex.1992).

Under the doctrine of partial performance, an oral contract for the purchase of real property is sufficiently corroborated and enforceable if the purchaser:

(1) pays consideration;

(2) takes possession of the property; and

(3) makes permanent and valuable improvements on the property with the consent of the seller, or, without such improvements, other facts are shown that would make the transaction a fraud on the purchaser if the oral contract was not enforced.